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Abstract 
This paper examines how networked coalitions of elite actors are formed, and subsequently 
orchestrated, in the context of corporate governance regulation. It is argued that dominant 
actors mould regulation which tends to fend off threats to the status quo, which is 
characterised by self-regulation and laissez-faire neoliberalism. In the process of developing 
corporate governance regulation, elites make connections across interdisciplinary fields, 
which fill ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992, Burt 1997) and thereby provide points of contact, 
between otherwise disparate actors in the field of power (FoP). 
This empirical focus of the paper is an analysis of elite networks in the mid-1990s, 
specifically the events and debates surrounding the influential 1995 Greenbury Committee, 
who established the current framework for remuneration policy in UK organisations. It 
illustrates how actors in the FoP, mobilise relatively weak network ties, to form high status 
elite networks which dictated the dominant discourse associated with top executive pay 
(TEP). In the case of the Greenbury provisions, we see the evolution of corporate governance 
regulation was less focused on the technocratic reform of TEP, and more concerned with 
political manoeuvrings before the 1997 general election. 
Informed by Bourdieu’s theorisation of the FoP, the concept of closure is introduced, as a 
specific process which occurs in the FoP. Through such closure mechanisms public concerns 
are recognized whilst concurrently presenting the ideological case for the defence of the 
status quo. Public opinion is then appeased by strengthening rules within existing 
frameworks, thereby preserving the power and autonomy of the corporate elite.    
 
 
  
Introduction 
Big business has come under severe criticism in recent years because of the escalation in top 
executive pay (TEP) and the contribution this has made to rising levels of inequality in 
income and distribution in wealth in many countries across the world (Atkinson 1983, 
Bourguignon 2013, Piketty 2014). The antecedents of these criticisms are a series of high 
profile cases where TEP has been deemed to be unreflective of personal merit or indeed, of 
corporate performance. These prevalence of these cases, has not deceased, despite by the 
passage of time.  
Critics of TEP argue that the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by executives and the 
monopoly power they exercise are the cause. Such a position is reflected a large corpus of 
work studying the relative power of top executives, loosely termed as the managerial 
hegemony school (Mace 1971, Lorsch 1989, Finkelstien 1992, Pettigrew 1992, Pettigrew and 
McNulty 1995, Pettigrew 1998). This analytical approach would argue that TEP scandals are 
failures in corporate governance as a result of managerial rent seeking (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003).  
Changes to systems of corporate governance coincide with corporate crises or scandals that 
expose abuses of power on the part of corporate elites and their allies in the FoP. When 
public opinion becomes inflamed, politicians come under pressure to legislate to prevent 
continued abuse, therefore potentially changing the rules of the game to decrease corporate 
power and limit the freedom to self-regulate. In every notable case of corporate governance 
reform, this is achieved by inviting business leaders to self-regulate, see for instance Cadbury 
(1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998), Tunrbull (1999), Higgs (2003), Walker (2009) 
and Kay (2012). This system of self-regulation adopted in the UK, means corporate elites are 
central to the process of governing, “what this means is businessmen, like administrators, 
wish to depoliticize highly contentious issues and to have these judged according to the 
criteria favoured by business. This may look like an avoidance of politics and ideology: it is 
in fact their clandestine importation into public affairs” (Miliband 1969: 52-53). 
The argument presented, although not necessarily endorsed, is that there are certain groups 
who have a vested interest in preserving the present social order and who are acutely aware of 
the threats posed by tangible public concerns about TEP. The focus of discussion therefore, is 
on how corporate elites exercise control over the institutional framework within which big 
business operates. The current system of corporate governance is based on the principle of 
self-regulation, and is one that it is seen by business as vital to preserve. Supporters of this 
system argue that to undermine this principle, would be to weaken the power of private 
corporations in relation to nation states and transnational bureaucracies. 
This paper make a contribution to the established canon of work centred on corporate elites 
led by Clegg & Hardy (1996), Maclean, Harvey and Press (2006), Phillips, Courpasson and 
Clegg (2006), Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2010), Zald & Lounsbury (2010), Maclean, 
Harvey and Kling (2015a, 2015b) and Reed (2012) but also to scholarly work on network 
dynamics. It extends the empirical focus beyond the conventional analysis of interlocking 
directorships or political affiliations, by highlighting the mechanisms of coalition formation 
in the FoP as being instrumental in realising significant changes in corporate governance. 
The empirical focus of this paper is the Greenbury Committee and their 1995 report, as an 
example of how the regulation is orchestrated through the formation of a coalition of various 
actors, in often disparate disciplinary fields. The argument unfolds in a semi-orthodox 
manner. The subsequent section reviews the literature in 3 key areas which frame the 
discussion, firstly the evolution of the corporate governance policy sicne 1992 is described, 
thereby contextualising the empirical focus of the paper. Secondly, the theoretical outline of 
the paper is introduced, which focuses on key Bourdieusian approaches to fields and power. 
Finally, the literature is reviewed pertaining to networks and corporate elites. The subsequent 
section then outlines the antecedents of the Greenbury committee, before moving to describe 
the methodology employed. Finally there is a discussion and a short conclusion.  
Literature Review  
Since the publication of the Cadbury report in 1992, there have been incremental changes in 
governance arrangements spurred by a number of ‘best practice’ reports (Greenbury 1995; 
Hampel 1998; Turnbull 1999; Higgs 2003; Walker 2009; Kay 2012). These report tended to 
be reactive measure to perceived problems or scandal recent to their times (Charkham 2008).  
The remedy for such failure seems to be always more regulation and increased transparency 
through disclosure. Corporate governance regulation in the UK tends to espouse this market 
based doctrine, that is, ‘comply or explain’. Comply with the recommendations, or 
alternatively, if compliance is not achieved, explain why the organisation is in non-
compliance.  
The development of the code of corporate governance can be seen to be accretive (Nordberg 
and McNulty 2013, Price and Campbell 2015). That is, iteratively evolving as a result of the 
evolution in best practice reporting.  Corporate governance reports are therefore constitutive 
of the wider discourse, but also implicitly tend to reproduce and support the discourse which 
preceded them, as Phillips, Lawrence and Hardy (2004: 642) explain, “actions that lead actors 
try to gain, maintain, or repair legitimacy are likely to result in the production of texts… 
[which are] produced in order to establish, verify, or change the meaning associated with 
action”. This process is not arbitrary; these texts tend to foster the dominant ideological 
discourse, through the use of institutionalised vocabularies. The authors of the corporate 
governance texts, “did not just select words from a language system, they select plots generic 
features, aspects of character, images, ways or narrating, even phrases and sentences from 
previous literary texts and from the literary tradition” (Allen 2011: 11).  In this regard, they 
both reflective of, and a component of, the continuous and ongoing debate surrounding the 
regulation of corporate governance. This is an example of what Maclean, Harvey and Kling 
(2015: 543) call the “interpellative power of rhetorical narrative”.  
In much the same way, it is an example of rhetorical history conferring legitimacy (Suddaby, 
Foster et al. 2010) by ordering and structuring ideas to pursue coherent objectives. Light 
touch, laissez-faire approaches to corporate governance have therefore become highly 
institutionalised. Concepts heavily referred to in the texts, such as accountability and 
transparency have become shibboleths of the era (Price and Campbell 2015).  
Network dynamics and the field of power (FoP). 
The theoretical framework adopted in this paper is broadly Bourdiuesian. Accordingly, it 
proposes that society is organised into fields represented by dominant and subordinate actors 
(Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). The mechanism described by other Bourdieusian scholars in 
an organisational context, is that as actors gain promotion, or progress in some other way, for 
instance via a merger or acquisition, they ascend through a number of fields (Maclean et al. 
2006). Each of these fields can be identified as a delineated social space with rules, actor 
dispositions and desirable practices (Maclean et al., 2015b).  The uppermost stratum of 
society, at the head of all other fields, is the field of power (Bourdieu 1993, Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1998), which sits at the pinnacle of the cultural and corporate worlds. Therefore 
the concept of the ‘field of power’ (FoP) is seen as an important one in in the context of 
corporate elites, “The field of power is a social space in which members of different elite 
groups freely mingle, recognised by one another as social and political equals” (Maclean, 
Harvey et al. 2006: 33). Ascension to the FoP is represented by the legitimacy and 
recognition gained as a result of the accumulation of capital in it various forms (Bourdieu 
1986).  
One of the key ideas about the FoP is that it sits at the top of a multi-disciplinary nest of other 
fields. These are normally defined as discipline specific. For instance, there may be fields 
covering health, law, politics or education. The existence of a ‘power elite’ (Mills 1953) 
constituted of dominant agents (Maclean et al. 2006, Maclean et al. 2010) suggests the 
existence of a group of actors who are operating above the individual field level and within a 
field which transcends these fields. This higher stratum of agents transcends institutional and 
organisational boundaries and facilitates elites in often very disparate fields to make 
connections (O'Mahony and Bechky 2006, O'Mahony and Bechky 2008). 
The cohort of actors who form the empirical setting for this paper we suggest, are 
representative of dominant agents who, as result of their social, economic, cultural and 
symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986) derive advantage from their positions in social and 
corporate networks (Maclean et al. 2006, Maclean et al. 2010). These dominant agents tend 
to wield large amounts of corporate power and social influence. This means they possess 
certain characteristics, for instance, they often hold both CEO and Chairman roles 
simultaneously (Maclean et al. 2010). More often than not, they oversee the largest, most 
powerful organisations. These are characterised as dominant organisations as Clegg, Carter, 
Kornberger & Swietzer (2011: 228) explain, “dominant people must be members of dominant 
organisations. Corporate domination signifies control of the economic field by this relatively 
small number of powerful companies, themselves controlled by a relatively small number of 
dominant agents”. 
The density of this group has been extensively studied within the organisational literature. A 
comprehensive and influential corpus of work has examined the cause and effect of 
interlocking directorships (Mizruchi and Stearns 1988, Mizruchi 1996, Brass, Galaskiewicz 
et al. 2004, Burris 2005). However, perhaps of greater relevance, is the mechanisms by which 
elites form coalitions and on what basis? Research has shown by activating ties between 
fields, corporate elites can transcend institutional and organisational boundaries, and often 
connect with elites in disparate fields (O'Mahony and Bechky 2006, O'Mahony and Bechky 
2008). Congruently, when connections are made by actors across fields, they fill ‘structural 
holes’ (Burt 1992, Burt 1997) and thereby provide points of contact, between otherwise 
disparate actors. Despite these actors operating in remote fields, they may otherwise possess 
many heterogeneous features, which act to facilitate network development (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin et al. 2001). Therefore structural relationships such as interlocking directorships 
or political affiliations, are not necessarily, prima facie evidence of strong relationships and 
move over, only represent only a possible means of mobilising power and influence 
(Stanworth and Giddens 1975). Indeed, Granovetter (1973) highlighted the ‘strength of weak 
ties’, suggesting that lower density networks may actually be as useful as stronger network 
ties (interlocking directorships, for example). In this way, less visible, lower density networks 
may be more useful in forming effective coalitions, than the more visible ties. Therefore it is 
clear that not all network ties are ‘wired’, and many are only activated when the need arises 
(Smith et al. 2012). 
Within the corporate governance best practice literature, however, it is more or less explicit 
that visible ties are those which stakeholders should focus their attention on. Higgs (2003) 
talks about structural relations, in particular referring to “relationships or circumstances 
which could affect, or appear to affect, the director’s judgement”, going on to cite “material 
business relationship” and “cross directorships” (Higgs 2003: 81-82) as being examples of 
such relationships.  
With this paradox in mind, there is clear value in examining how actors in the FoP mobilise 
less visible ties, to form high status elite networks. Research examining the development of 
networks and their evolution, identifies their orchestration, as centrally important in 
determining their effectiveness (Paquin and Howard-Grenville 2013). This “coming together 
of field networks” (Maclean and Harvey 2016: 4) is an example of how elite actors are able 
to extend their reach beyond their proximal networks, and connect with other high status 
elites within the FoP (Bourdieu 1993, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998) and in doing so, 
arguably, form a more cohesive, and effective, coalition. This process, it is argued, is 
illustrative of the mechanisms by which socio-political domination is achieved by an 
organised few, over the unorganised many (Mosca 1939, Dahl 1961, Miliband 1969).  
The antecedents of the Greenbury committee 
The early 1990s were a period of great economic and social change (Stiglitz 2003). One of 
the key policies of the Conservative government was the privatisation of the UKs national 
utilities. As these national utilities became public companies, their management, who were 
formerly modestly paid public servants, now found themselves exposed to labour market 
forces, which in many cases, resulted in substantial pay increases. Of these increases, there 
were a number of notable cases which the press focused on. In particular there was the case 
of Cedric Brown, the former CEO of British Gas who was dubbed by The Independent 
newspaper at the time as, “the least popular man in Britain” (Ward 1995: 17). The 
contemporary mood in the early 1990s was described as, “highly febrile” (Committee 
member 8) and that there was a “groundswell” (Committee member 10) following the 
publication of a Sunday Times article in 1994 that described Browns pay was 43 times that of 
the average British Gas employee and he came to symbolise the caricature of the corporate 
fat cat (Cope 1996).  The British Gas affair is often cited as a “watershed” (Maitland 2008: 
156) in the run up to the Greenbury report. It has been recognised that privatisation in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, “played a critical role in understanding the need for good corporate 
governance” (Maclean, 1999: 93) and the Greenbury recommendations were part of a broader 
movement to address, “public concerns” (Greenbury 1995: 6).  
The story of how Sir Richard Greenbury rose to become chairman and CEO of Marks and 
Spencer’s and subsequently ended up chairman of the report into directors remuneration, was 
and still is, central to the perceived legitimacy of the report’s findings. After attending Ealing 
Grammar he joined Marks and Spencer in 1952 as a junior management trainee, he 
eventually rose to become a director in 1970. Thereafter he became joint managing director 
in 1978, CEO in 1988 and chairman (jointly) in 1991. He personified what Kerr and 
Robinson (2011) called the, “bootstrap boys, who… work their way up to the field of power” 
(Kerr and Robinson: 2011: 158). Its critical to note, Greenbury’s background, career 
trajectory and position gave him a certain legitimacy; here was a man who had clearly 
illustrated he was in business for the long term, a one company man who was trusted to be 
the first non-family CEO of Marks and Spencer, which itself was, one of the UK’s most 
cherished brands. The symbolism of the appointment should not be underestimated. As 
Mowbray (1995: 3) puts it, Marks and Spencer’s is, “the high-street incarnation of our values 
and aspirations… synonymous with service, organisation and trustworthiness”. Furthermore, 
Sir Richard was not only a patron of the Samaritans (1992 – 1997) at the time, but “knew 
John Major well and got on well with him” (Committee Member 1). He was ideally placed in 
the FoP to provide legitimacy for what was an extremely symbolic issue both in terms of 
governance, and in the wider political field. 
Methodology - A synthesis of history and organisational studies 
This study reports on a series of in depth, oral history interviews with the influential 1995 
Greenbury committee. This research project represents a ‘historical’ approach, in so much as 
it analyses an ‘event’ of significance (Norman 1991), particularly with hindsight, that took 
place. Therefore in defining an oral history, (Richie 2003: 19) suggested that, “simply put, 
oral history collects memories and personal commentaries of historical significance through 
recorded interview.”  The issues debated in this paper are deeply embedded in their historical 
context. For instance, remuneration, fairness and accountability are only historically 
contextual. In other words, the scandals relating to the nationalisation of British industry and 
events at British Gas very much reflected the zeitgeist. These are events which were situated 
uniquely in their era and acted as an “important symbolic resource” (Suddaby et al. 2010: 
149) and interpretative lens.   
By harnessing the concept of creative synthesis, which Harvey (2014) defines as, “an 
integration of group members’ perspectives into a shared understanding that is unique to the 
collective” (p325), this paper develop an heightened understanding of the FoP and presents a 
novel insight into taken-for-granted beliefs and assumptions, the committee propagated, 
which have endured.The data collected represents the most comprehensive method of piecing 
together the thoughts, actions and feelings of these important events in the mid-1990s. In this 
sense, the research seeks to create a complete and candid account of an important historical 
event in business history.  
The interview transcripts are intended to form a reliable record of events, woven with 
hindsight commentary. However, the data is not simply a record of events and proceedings 
that have taken place, or a repository of readymade data (Rowlinson, Hassard et al. 2014), 
they have the ability to deliver new knowledge and to provide challenging insights into 
mainstream forms of knowledge (Field 2007).   
Given the focus of the interviews was principally a historical event, which went on to have 
enormous empirical and policy significance, it would not be unsurprising if some of the oral 
submissions may possibly be tinged with some hindsight bias. This could lead to a suggestion 
that the accounts collected reflect a consensual and collective reality, which can arguably 
never fully capture the empirical detail of the past objectively (Lowenthal, 1985). The 
accounts delivered may represent a form of rhetorical history (Suddaby et al., 2010), which is 
the strategic (and often instrumental) use of the past, to manage the future. 
The theory relating to temporally nested issues, such as pay and performance, merit and talent 
on which TEP rests, are historically constructed and imprinted (Stinchcombe and March 
1965). The intention is that in understanding events through a particular lens, or series of 
temporally located perspectives, we can develop fresh insight to challenge existing thinking 
relating to corporate governance. Underpinning this perspective, is the idea that history and 
organisational studies are of equal status; the notion of dual integrity (Maclean, Harvey et al. 
2015). Dual integrity implies the, “mutual respect and demonstrable competence” (p17), in 
both organisational and historical scholarship. It represents the symbiotic relationship 
between the study of organisations and the historical context in which that study takes place.   
The biographical data collected and presented in Table 1, was a synthesis of information 
gleaned from both the ‘Who’s Who’ database, and the oral history interviews conducted by 
the author in 2014.  
Actor Occupational 
Field 
Substantive Occupational 
Role 
Elite Networking Role Greenbury Role 
Hon. Michael 
Heseltine MP 
 Political 
 Corporate 
 President of the 
board of trade: 
UK Govt. 
 MP for Henley  Instigator  
Sir Richard 
Greenbury 
 Corporate   Chairman & 
CEO: Marks and 
Spencer 
 Trustee: The Royal 
Academy  
 Trustee: The 
Samaritans  
 Chairman 
Sir Denys 
Henderson 
 Corporate  Chairman & 
CEO: Imperial 
chemical 
industries  
 Board Member: CBI 
 Member: European 
Round Table of 
Industrialists 
 Member 
Sir David 
Chapman bt1. 
 Corporate  Director: Brewin 
Dolphin 
Securities Ltd. 
 Board Member: 
Northern Rock PLC 
 Chairman: CBI North 
East Regional 
Advancement Group 
 Member  
Sir Michael 
Angus 
 Corporate  Chairman: 
Whitbread  
 Chairman: Boots 
 Board Member: CBI 
 Board Member: 
Natwest Bank 
 Board Member: 
British Airways 
 Board Member: RAC 
Holdings 
 Governor: London 
Stock Exchange 
 Member: European 
Round Table of 
Industrialists 
 Member 
Lord [Iain] 
Vallance 
 Corporate  CEO: British 
Telecom 
 Board Member: CBI 
 Board Member: 
Business in the 
community 
 Member 
                                                          
1 Baronet.  
 Board Member: 
British American 
Chamber of 
Commerce  
Sir David 
Simon 
 Corporate  CEO: British 
Petroleum 
 Member: European 
Round Table of 
Industrialists 
  
 Member 
Mr Geoff 
Lindey 
 Financial  Director:  JP 
Morgan 
 Chairman: NAPF 
Investment committee 
 Strategic Advisor: 
NAPF 
 Board Member: CFA 
Institute  
 Member 
Tim Melville-
Ross 
 Corporate  Director-General: 
Institute of 
Directors 
 Board Member: 
Monument Oil and 
Gas 
 Member 
Sir David 
Lees 
 Corporate  Chairman: GKN  Board Member: Tate 
& Lyle 
 Board Member: 
Courtaulds 
 Board Member: CBI 
 Member: European 
Round Table of 
Industrialists 
 Board Member: 
National Defence 
Industries Council 
 Member 
Mr Robert 
Walther 
 Financial   CEO: Clerical 
Medical 
Investment Group 
 Board Member: 
Association of British 
Insurers 
 Board Member: 
Flemming 
Claverhouse 
 Board Member: 
Fidelity European 
Values 
 Member 
Mr George 
Metcalfe 
 Corporate  Chairman & 
CEO: UEMCO 
 Board Member: 
Sailport 
 Board Member: CBI 
 Freeman of the City 
of London 
 Member 
Mr John 
Grieves 
 Legal  Senior Partner: 
Freshfields Law 
 Board Member: 
British Invisibles 
 Advisor 
Mr Peter 
Jeffcote 
 Legal  General Counsel: 
Freshfields Law 
  Advisor 
Mr Angus 
Maitland 
 Corporate  Chairman & 
CEO: Maitland 
PLC 
  Advisor  
Mr John 
Carney 
 Corporate  Managing 
Director: Towers 
Perrin 
  Advisor 
Mr Andrew 
Edwards cb2. 
 Civil 
Service 
 Deputy Secretary: 
UK Treasury 
 Board Member: Royal 
Opera House 
 Advisor 
Table 1: The Greenbury Committee and their roles in 1995. 
                                                          
2 Companion of the Bath.  
Discussion  
Actors and their roles 
Following Knoke and Yangs’ (2008) perspective on social networks, and echoing Ball (2008) 
and Brass, Galaskiewicz et al. (2004) notion of ‘convening power’ in networks, Maclean & 
Harvey (2016) defined actors in elite networks to be either nodal or sentinel. The distinction 
between the two types of actors is significant as their location in the network constellation, 
relative to each other, determines the relative strength of the network.  According to Maclean 
& Harvey (2016) both nodal and sentinel actors can be either organisations, or the key 
representative or protagonists of a campaign or event. Nodal actors have a “natural 
constituency, legitimate voice and convening power which assumes responsibility for 
promoting the interests of the field” (Maclean and Harvey 2016: 6) whilst a sentinel actor, 
“by virtue of its [or their] status and reputation plays a key role in defending the interests of 
the field”. They tend to be guardians of the heritage of the field, who often have a 
longstanding affiliation with the issue and its context.  
 
Figure 1: The Greenbury network 
The driving force behind the Greenbury provisions were a number of key nodal actors. These 
actors had direct links to both the CBI, the official convening organisation, and also 
affiliation sentinel organisations. In such a way they behaved as a convening force and public 
interface. Emerging from the data, a picture of 3 key nodal actors operating in the FoP at the 
time. These are Michael Hesletine, who contrary to the contents of the Greenbury report, 
instigated the formation of the committee, Sir Michael Angus, Chairman of Natwest Bank 
and of course Sir Richard Greenbury. These actors convened elites with often very weak 
network ties. The formation of the committee is illustrative of networks acting as a, 
“multiplier” (Bourdieu, 1986: 246) of the capital the agent possesses in his own right; “The 
profits which accrue from membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes 
them possible” (p246). There is a clearly observable trajectory of some of the Greenbury 
members as a result of the transmutability of capital from social to symbolic, then finally to 
economic. The Greenbury committee can be theorised to have provided the vehicle for its 
members to sustain such a trajectory. For instance, there were a number of ties, which linked 
certain members together in the FoP. On the subject of his connection to Sir Richard one 
member said, 
“No, but I didn’t know him [Greenbury, but] I knew of him. You know what it is, 
the network… people know other people, but they’re not necessarily friends. I was 
an acquaintance of his” (Committee member 11). 
Such a relationship is an example of how social capital, in this case a person’s network, is 
mobilised and transmuted into other forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986), which then facilitates 
movement between fields. The committee’s formation, is an example of how interlocks 
within the FoP are propagated and ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992, Burt 1997) in networks are 
filled. Via their intervention these, “multi positional actors” (Maclean et al., 2015b: 189), 
helped to perpetuate common, field wide, interests. Broadly, this aimed to defeat the threat of 
statute over the issue of executive remuneration, thus keeping the issue within their control of 
their cohort. This echoes strongly with Bourdieu’s theory, that elite members in society tend 
to follow, “strategies of conservation” (Swartz 1998: 125), the success of which tends to 
mediate the development of the field. It is a characterised by Bourdieu as a method which the 
dominant employ to counter [potential] subversion.  
The mechanism by which this occurs is worthy of discussion and in particular the mechanism 
by which coalitions are formed. For instance, the role of ‘Maitland’, the committee’s PR 
company, was critical in the operation of the network. There was great anxiety at the time 
[concerning the issue of executive remuneration] and it was clear that something must be 
done to help, 
“It [the Greenbury committee] was instigated by the Conservative party who were 
concerned at the bad reputation about pay that was developing, particularly in 
the private sector and that was a vote loser” (Committee member 1). 
Maitland was already formally employed on a pro-bono basis as a public relations consultants 
to many of the members of the committee. For instance, Sir Richard Greenbury was a key 
client of theirs at Marks and Spencer, as was Sir Denys Henderson at ICI, and Sir Iain 
Vallance at BT. This echoes Burt’s (1997: 370) thesis that the “strongest evidence of social 
capital effects [are] with the combined network of personal and corporate relations”. 
They played an important role in creating a story, in forming a discourse, which could be 
easily disseminated and understood by the wider public, whose support was required. 
Maitland, wasn’t politically active, “yet serve[d] as stalwart defenders of the field when 
required to do so” (Maclean 2016: 16).  They therefore contributed to the legitimacy of the 
provisions enshrined in the report in the way they communicated the committee’s key 
messages and rebuffing any criticisms directed at it. Such actors, are crucial to the 
coordination in a crisis (Brass, Galaskiewicz et al. 2004). The role of the company was 
described thus,  
“I got a call from Iain Vallance asking if I would help the committee, protect its 
reputation and protect the reputation of Sir Richard and deal with the press… So 
my appointment was really to do with the reputation of the committee itself and 
the individual members of the committee. In particular to work closely with Rick 
to ensure he stuck to the party line” (Committee member 9). 
Therefore, Maitland’s role was to “protect the reputation” of those in the FoP and 
ensure Sir Richard adhered to the collective narrative or “stuck to the party line” 
(Committee Member 9). Maitland’s role can also be seen as defending the corporate 
actors, against those in the press, and in society more widely, who sought to counter-say 
their objectives and challenge their power as Committee member 9 elucidates,  
“this [the remuneration issue] was a gift to the Labour opposition, two of whom 
were held up in the Labour headquarters in Milbank running the communications 
campaign against the Tories so Cedric Brown was a very useful club with which 
to beat the Tory Government” (Committee member 9). 
Therefore the role of Maitland was to create and effectively disseminate a credible story 
whilst simultaneously rebuffing any challenges to the dominant agents and their collective 
narrative. Furthermore it was recognised that in order to quell the public fervour surrounding 
executive pay the ‘reputation’, or how the public perceive Sir Richard and others, had to be 
carefully managed as Maitland (2008: 157)  points out,  “if a [remuneration] crisis is 
anticipated and prepared for assiduously, more often than not it can be managed”. This 
statement indicates how those in the FoP attempt to retain control over issues which are 
important to them and their network, and is an exemplar of the critical role played by lower 
status actors outside of the FoP.  
Corporate governance regulation: Actor coalitions 
The cohesiveness of the elite network presented here is far from strong. It seems the term 
coalition, may be more appropriately applied. From an analysis of Figure 1, there were 
clearly organisations that linked actors, the CBI for instance was a forum in which 4 of the 
members met, but none of these bonds seemed to be formal or solidaristic. For instance, on 
the subject of his connection to Sir Richard one member said, 
“I was chairman of the CBI economic affairs committee from 1988 to the middle 
of 1994. Greenbury himself was in and around the CBI so I suspect I was picked 
up from that” (Committee member 11). 
Whilst another commented, “you meet these people around on the circuit and we always had 
things to talk about” (Committee member 5). This degree of fragmentation seems to resonate 
strongly with Mizruchi (2013) thesis pertaining to a similar degree of fragmentation in the 
context of US corporate elites. This is attributed, amongst another things, to an increasing 
degree of conservatism since the mid-1970s (Mizruchi 2013) and declining elite network 
densities (Barnes and Ritter 2001) particularly in the first decade of this century (Chu and 
Davis 2011). However, findings from this study indicate that when faced with challenges to 
their collective interests, dominant corporate agents have a propensity to contribute to 
narratives which legitimise their dominance, “sustained by public perception of their civic 
mindedness, they become the purveyors of legitimising narratives” (Maclean et al., 2014a: 
829).  
The Greenbury provisions were an exemplar of a series of events leading to a crisis, which 
was caused, addressed and resolved by dominant agents themselves. The perception of the 
public was critical in establishing the legitimacy that elite groups seek, to substantiate their 
narrative. They occupied what Mills (1953: 4) called, “the strategic command posts of the 
social structure,” and in doing so, helped in forming the dominant discourse relating to these 
issues. 
 
Figure 2: The Greenbury committee and the field of power. 
This process of generating corporate governance regulation was clearly directly orchestrated 
by business elites, under the auspices of the CBI, but it was actually instigated by political 
elites. This is evidenced by the admission of the then, President of the Board of Trade, 
Michael Heseltine in his autobiography, “In order to try and deflect some of the criticism and 
particularly to look for a means of avoiding future outcry, I invited Sir Richard Greenbury to 
examine the issues involved” (Heseltine 2000: 468). It seems the instruction had come from 
the Prime Minister himself as a result of tensions before a historically important general 
election, 
“Major was very worried about this [executive pay issues] and of course it might 
be helpful if we [The Greenbury committee] say something that helps.”  
(Committee member 5). 
Therefore led by high status business leaders, drawn from the corporate elite, the political 
elite instigated regulation as a result of political pressure, but where able to defer to these 
professional ‘experts’ in remuneration should any critics with to counter-say their findings. 
This treatment is loyal to Bourdieu theory of field (Bourdieu 1993) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
1998) and is typical of network formation in the FoP insomuch as distinct groups of actors, 
from differing fields, come together to find solutions to issues of mutual significance and 
therefore, “make common cause in realising or defending society wide institutional 
arrangements” (Maclean & Harvey 2016: 3). The formation of this type of regulation is 
described by one respondent as a, 
“quasi academic, quasi bureaucratic structure of regulation to which parliament 
has abdicated its responsibilities… This so called ‘independent’ group aren’t 
answerable to anybody” (Committee member 12). 
Indeed the proximity of Greenbury and his cohort to the political elite is a rather obvious 
criticism which could be levelled. The relationships between the corporate elite and ruling 
political elite, was commented on in relation to the formation of the committee (as eluded to 
in the previous section). It’s an example of the, almost symbiotic, nature of the relationship 
between various agents in these groups emphasising the central importance of reciprocity, 
shared values and trust (Josserand 2004). 
“It was set up effectively by the government, who wanted first of all to kick this as 
a problem into the long grass [the issue of Cedric Brown’s rewards], because it 
was quite a nice thing to do to say ‘I’m not going to answer any questions on this 
because the committee is now sitting’ and once the committee had finished, 
Greenbury and his… almost political aides, were given a fair amount of staffing 
to work it though” (Committee member 7). 
This comment not only illustrates how embedded Sir Richard Greenbury was with the 
political elite, but also supports Milibands (1969) thesis (outlined in the introduction of this 
paper) that in deferring to business leaders, elite groups sought to ‘depoliticise’ this highly 
contentious issue by kicking it into the long grass. It is clear that the Greenbury committee 
was a politically motivated project sparked by, “public and shareholder concerns” 
(Greenbury, 1995: 7) but equally focused on the internal concerns of the Conservative party 
and the business elites who were subject to the criticism.  
Many of the findings laid out above are consistent with capture theories of regulation (Posner 
1974, Stigler, 1971) which support the claim by political scientists that, “regulation serves the 
interest of politically effective groups” (Posener 1974: 343). The insight this paper provides 
however, is less about if the regulation serves these groups, but more about how these groups 
come to ensure their objectives are achieved. The conclusion therefore, is not simply some 
form of neo-Marxist syllogism that corporate elites and political elites, because they control 
the regulatory process, develop self-serving regulations. The empirical example provided has 
illustrated that the answer is much more nuanced, complex and indeed un-coordinated than 
that. However, there is also clear empirical support for the neo-Marxist claim that the process 
of corporate governance regulation is a mode of bureaucratic conservatism, Mannhiem spoke 
(1936: 105) of, “the fundamental tendency of all bureaucratic thought is to turn all problems 
of politics, into problems of administration”, which he says are, “an attempt to hide the 
problems of politics”.       
 
Conclusion 
The privileged access to the Greenbury committee and its advisors which was granted, 
allowed an insight into the inner workings of the FoP in the mid-1990s. Such events and 
discussions normally take place backstage (Scott 1990) and as such, the findings presented 
offer a revised narrative, to the one presented to the public and in formal transcripts of event.  
The formation of the committee was an example of how the big questions of the day were 
dealt with through dialogue and negotiation within the FoP (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1998). 
In harvesting and then disseminating cultural capital, and with it, championing a cause 
perceived as centrally important to the wider public, Sir Richard was able to reinforce his 
personal credibility, and that of the report, as Gordon, Harvey et al. (2010: 7) note, “together, 
possession of high levels of cultural, social and symbolic capital enables dominant economic 
actors to increase their influence and power to determine the outcomes of societal events”.  
High status actors can be seen as critical in stage managing (Scott 1990) and in facilitating 
the development of what were relatively weak associations in the FoP amongst its members. 
These actors were central in developing a critical momentum for provisions they developed. 
However, the research also illustrates that often background players, were equally as 
important as their higher status counterparts, in ensuring the success of the regulation they 
impose. For instance, the public relations experts, the remuneration experts and the civil 
service all played a critical role in galvanising and legitimising the committee’s 
recommendations. Therefore the construction of an effective constellation of actors in the 
network, was centrally important in their defence to a common threat.    
The key insight of this paper is in highlighting the Greenbury committee as an illustration of 
the quasi-political form of self-regulation administered by the ruling elite. Theoretically the 
contribution is in characterising this process as closure, which is identified as a particular 
class of operation in the field of power. This idea resonates with the work of post-Marxists 
such as Mills, (1953) Miliband (1969) and Bourdieu (1984, 1993) Bourdieu and Waquant 
(1998) who all identified a broader unified elite, formed from a distinct strata of society.  
However the key nuance is that in proposing the idea of closure, as a particular process in the 
FoP, the unity of elite groups are only combined on an issue-by-issue basis, which in this case 
was exemplified by the treatment of the issue of TEP.   
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